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Abstract  
 
The evidence pointing to a fundamental link between abundance in natural resources and 
unsustainable development processes in developing countries has caught attention lately, one 
aspect of this being the „resource curse‟. 
This paper aims to demonstrate the extent to which the resource abundance can explain the 
unsustainable economic development process of Kazakhstan. It aims to answer the 
overarching research question: How does the dependence on natural resources affect the 
economic development in Kazakhstan? with sub questions: a) Is economic development 
deficient due to poor political institutions?, b) If poor political institutions are present, shall 
the case of Kazakhstan be defined by the resource curse or the rentier state theory? 
The analysis is carried out through applying theories of natural resource curse and rentier 
state on the case of Kazakhstan, thereby assessing how both theoretical models and 
exceptional country factors shape the developmental outcome in Kazakhstan altogether with 
its economic, political and social progresses. However, it is observed that resource curse 
theory alone is not able to explain Kazakhstan‟s inability to be engaged in significant steps 
towards proper governance of sustainable economic diversification. Both low economic 
diversification and neopatrimonial structures combined with the Post Soviet legacies 
consolidate rentierism effects in the country. Thus, the study demonstrates that the rentier 
state approach seems to be applicable in Kazakhstan. 
 
Keywords:  natural resources, resource curse, Kazakhstan, rentier state, Soviet legacy, 
economic diversification 
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1. Introduction 
 
The former Soviet Union countries that are rich in oil and gas tend to have low levels of 
economic diversification and their governments are becoming more and more authoritarian 
(Gelman 2010). This particularly applies to the transitional, newly emerged economy of 
Kazakhstan. This section consists of research background and problem, significance of the 
study, research question and aims, definitions of resource curse and rentier state and thesis 
outline. 
 
1.1 Research background and problem 
In the aftermath of Soviet Union dissolution, the Central Asian region has reemerged as an 
area of increasing importance, particularly due to its natural resources. Kazakhstan, is a post 
Soviet transitional economy in Central Asia, located between the two global powers of Russia 
and China, neighboring with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Caspian Sea (see Figure 1). 
Kazakhstan gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and began to rely on the 
extraction of natural resources in the early twentieth century, following the upturn in both oil 
prices and proven oil reserves (Pomfret 2005: 680). Since its independence the country has 
been transitioning from a Soviet framework into „something else’. However this   „something 
 Figure 1. Main resources exported by the Post Soviet Countries, M. Zagozina 2014 
  
else` does not possess a proper definition yet (Rumer 1996: 15). Indeed, the transition 
towards a new societal structure that would possess both elements of market economy and 
capitalist society has not happened in economic history before (ibid.). It cannot be argued that 
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Kazakhstan is transitioning towards the liberal democracy of a Western type either. The 
resource curse phenomenon which has been broadly addressed in the fields of political 
science, economics and development, is especially relevant to the former Soviet Union bloc. 
Former Soviet Union states are functioning according to autocratic regime types that highly 
rely on revenues from their natural resources. These states have been transforming into a new 
type of regime called the rentier state regime. Moreover, the connection between the post-
communist regimes, resource abundance and rentierism has been scarcely examined up until 
now (Esanov et al. 2001; Franke et al 2009: 110). 
Figure 2, GDP Growth of Kazakhstan (in %), 1991-2016, WB Data 2017 
 
A high dependency on natural resources becomes very harmful for the economy when world 
primary goods markets tend to be volatile (Auty 2001). In the case of Kazakhstan, the move 
towards a floating exchange rate regime that happened in August 2015 has driven the abrupt 
depreciation of national currency Kazakhstani tenge (KZT). Moreover, this also resulted in    
sharp increase of the inflation rate: from approximately 3.8 percent annually before August 
2015 up to 16,7 percent as of May 2016. This altogether eroded consumer purchasing power 
and real wages in the country. Particularly, low income households became the most 
vulnerable to the increase in prices, decline in wages and narrowing employment 
opportunities (World Bank Group 2016: 1-3). The GDP growth dynamics continued to slow 
down (1 % as of 2016, Figure 2) across all sectors in the economy as oil prices fell on the 
international market. Consequently, both external and internal demands have been 
experiencing a weakening downward trend (World Bank Group 2016: 2-3), which suggests 
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the potential dominance of extractive sectors, as well as vulnerability of the economy of 
Kazakhstan. 
 
Furthermore, resource dependent economies have a tendency to have lower governance 
quality and they are found to experience a number of negative political-economic distributive 
patterns (Barma 2014:257). They are also more likely to have authoritarian governing 
structures (Dunning 2008, Ross 2012). These tendencies have also been observed in the case 
of Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan has been functioning with hyper centralized political system since 
independence and lately demonstrated a tendency towards even greater authoritarianism 
(Freedom House 2017). A crucial element which will be analyzed  in this study is how the 
resource dependent state of Kazakhstan generates and distributes income windfalls from the 
rents, and how that links these various side effects of its economic development and 
determines its outcome today. 
 
1.1.1 Political economy of Traditional and Contemporary Kazakhstan 
 
Clans concept 
 
The peculiarity of the Kazakh political system, both traditional and contemporary has to do 
with the dominance of the clans. Clans in traditional Kazakhstan were based on family ties, 
and were the basis of the economy and governance of the Kazakh nomadic society. When 
referred to the clan as a particular unit of political organization, it implies a group of people 
around an individual with power, thus, those individuals share interests of businesses and 
lobbies via decision of state authorities. It is the contemporary clan system of Kazakhstan that 
rules the political economy of the country (Dorozhkin and Igbayev 2009: 136). Although the 
Soviet system was based purely on communist ideology by discouraging the aristocratic 
classes from the ruling positions, clan mentality persisted and has been the base of 
independent Kazakhstani political ideology up to now (Dorozhkin and Igbayev 2009: 135-
137; Ibadildin 2012: 54).  
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Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule 
The Soviet system at its core has always been portrayed as suffering from weak institutional 
quality (Zagozina 2014: 19). In the 1920s, Soviet authorities abolished large estates, 
administered the forced collectivization and removed the sources of traditional authority in 
Kazakhstan. The inheritance of the weak state and the institutional quality from Soviet rule 
established the platform for significant economic uncertainty to occur in the country (Pomfret 
2005: 859). With regard to the drastic ideological switch after the Soviet Union dissolution, 
today‟s ruling elite does not differ much from one of the Soviet period, both in terms of 
composition and administrative governance methods. The most feasible explanation of that 
lies in disorganisation (Pomfret 2005: 861), the consequences of which will be explained 
further in this study. 
 
Kazakhstan after Soviet Rule  
Scholars consider the independence of Central Asia states as a Russian political default, 
because Kazakhstan‟s independence did not happen due to any national liberation movement, 
it was a result of Moscow‟s decision to withdraw its maintenance of the Soviet Doctrine 
(Cummings 2002: 1). As Olcott (2010) put it, Kazakhstan was „catapulted’ into 
independence.  
Figure 3, Total Natural Resource Rents in Kazakhstan ( % of GDP), WB 2017 
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By looking at figure 3, it is observed that contemporary Kazakhstan possesses rents from a 
variety of natural resources, that is natural gas, minerals and coal; the share of rents from 
resources in GDP tends to be quite high in the country – 27, 6 % in 2008 and 20 % in 2012 
(WB 2017). This evidence points to the potential absence of meaningful economic 
diversification and heavy dependence of the Kazakh economy on resources to generate its 
revenues and GDP, which in turn are signs of the presence of a resource curse. 
 
When the government moved towards price liberalisation in January 1992, the institutions 
required for a well-functioning market economy were not in place (Pomfret 2005: 860). By 
the 1990s the privatisation process in Kazakhstan was characterized by asset sales mainly, so 
by the 1997 majority of the most valuable state enterprises were sold (ibid). At that time the 
attention of Kazakh government shifted towards oil sector development, which was more and 
more characterized by the elite‟s wealth accumulation. The economy was hit by several 
negative exogenous shocks in the late 1990s, and in the early 2000s Kazakhstan entered the 
oil boom period (ibid). Since then the country enjoyed rapid economic growth up until 2014 
(refer to Figure 2). The state has been gaining more favorable oil transportation opportunities 
and even larger discoveries of resources in the country. The proven reserves ensure a 
substantial oil flow until the mid of the twenty first century at the least (Pomfret 2005: 863).  
 
1.2 Significance of the study 
 
As Laruelle (2016: 10) states, Kazakhstan has been in the spotlight in terms of policy making, 
while the scholarship focused on other aspects of  the development process of Kazakhstan 
and its society is very modest. Moreover, the „resource curse‟ as a decisive factor in 
development of the Post Soviet Caspian region has not been universally accepted among 
scholars up to now (Meissner 2010: 7). So far, no study could do justice to the state building 
complexity of the country as ethnically diverse, as large and as resource rich as Kazakhstan 
(Olcott 2010: 2). Therefore, it is essential that “future research should henceforth apply 
comprehensive, country‐specific, and in‐depth context analyses” which have been previously 
neglected in academia (Meissner 2010: 8). This paper studies if any of the side effects from 
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resource abundance in Kazakhstan depend on its internal conditions, which is where this 
study fills the gap and makes its contribution to overall research. 
 
1.3 Research question and aims  
 
This case study aims to analyze the degree to which resource curse could account for the 
absence of economic diversification and sustainable economic development in Kazakhstan. 
This is done through applying both resource curse and rentier state theory on the case of 
Kazakhstan. Therefore, the research will answer its main overarching question: How does 
dependence on natural resources affect the economic development in Kazakhstan? with the 
sub questions:  
a) Is economic development deficient due to poor political institutions? 
b) If poor political institutions are present, shall the case of Kazakhstan be defined by the 
resource curse or the rentier state theory? 
This will be done by, first, assessing the dominance of the oil industry in the economy by 
analyzing recent diversification trends in the country; second, by applying the resource curse 
and rentier state theories on the Kazakh case. The study will base its analysis within the 
1990-2017 time framework, mainly focusing on the 2000-2017 timespan, as the year of 2000 
is the benchmark of Kazakhstan‟s entering the oil boom period.  
 
 
1.4 Definitions: Resource Curse and Rentier State  
 
The natural resource curse, often referred to as the „paradox of plenty‟ relates to the failure 
of resource dominant states to fully benefit from the resource windfalls by having worse 
economic performance, as well as the failure “for governments in these countries to respond 
effectively to public welfare needs” (NRGI 2015: 1). 
 
The rentier state concept comes from the subcategory of research on the resource curse 
phenomenon. Thus the implication of the rentier state as one of the curse manifestations is 
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appropriate, although it is a separate research field in its own right. Mahdavy (1970) in his 
study on oil rich states in Middle East, defined the rentier state as the state receiving rents 
from foreign actors, be it enterprises, governments or individuals; in relation to its importance 
in economic situations when “oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting 
countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies” 
(1970: 429). In the rentier state, oil and mineral abundance is assumed to spawn growth 
restricting state intervention together with extraordinarily levels of rent-seeking, where  rent-
seeking competition is negative in terms of the developmental results it generates (Di John 
2011: 3). 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
The next section of this study is the previous studies section, which observes the literature 
research done on Kazakhstan and its relation to the resource curse. Further on, there is a 
methods section which includes the research design, data quality and limitations of this study. 
Thereafter, the following section is the theoretical framework, which explores the resource 
curse, particularly its two sub models: Dutch disease and institutional quality; and a rentier 
state theory. Then the analysis of empirical findings follows; this section is divided into sub-
sections that analyze stated theories and theoretical concepts. At the end of the thesis, there is 
a conclusion. 
 
2. Previous studies 
 
The existing literature, both empirical and theoretical, on the resource curse and rentierism in 
Kazakhstan varies largely in every regard. The research is rarely up-to-date with the current 
academic debate on the resource curse topic (Meissner 2010: 18). 
 
Yessengali Oskenbayev (2015) in his study called „International analyses of natural resource 
curse and Kazakhstan’s related economic performance with special attention to its wheat and 
energy sectors’,  examined the role of natural resource abundance for economic development 
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and quality of institutions focusing on Kazakhstan and the rest of the CIS countries. By 
comparing two subsamples (1990-2000; 2001-2010), the author found that the impact of 
direct resource curse might disappear, while indirect impact (that is through the quality of 
institutions) is constant for both periods observed. This implies that resource curse via 
institutional quality established important linkages between economic growth and natural 
resources. Furthermore, the analysis shows the significant impact of the agricultural sector on 
institutional quality and concludes that in Post Soviet countries agricultural sectors are 
despondent on the state. The study provides a broad overview of the evidence of state 
companies‟ dominance having a negative influence on reform progresses in the countries 
(Oskenbayev 2015).  
 
Eger and Leonard (2007) in their research „Dutch Disease scare in Kazakhstan: Is it real?’ 
shed light on Dutch Disease as a theoretical aspect of the resource curse, and its negative 
impact on the economy of Kazakhstan. The authors (2007) assessed the mechanism by which 
oil prices fluctuations on the world market could harm the non-oil manufacturing. They found 
that in the open sector real exchange rate appreciated because of the nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. Their econometric evidence has shown that the rising trend in oil prices and oil 
revenues may be linked to the U.S dollar exchange rate of both non-oil and oil sectors; 
however, this appreciation is limited only to the oil sectors‟ real effective exchange rate. It is 
not significant statistically for the non-oil manufacturing. Therefore, Eger and Leonard 
(2007) came to conclusion that Kazakhstan has not been affected by the Dutch Disease. 
 
Finally, Akram Esanov (Revenue Watch Institute, 2009) in his study ‘Economic 
Diversification - The case for Kazakhstan‟ examined the Kazakh diversification experience 
by assessing the efficiency of Kazakh government policies in promoting economic 
diversification. The study (2009) pointed to the weak regulation of the financial sector in the 
country, weaknesses in economic and political institutions and geographical location of the 
country to be decisive for the absence of sustainable economic development. Esanov (2009)  
writes that given weak regulations, Kazakh banking sector borrowed heavily from the 
international capital markets and instead of loaning to the manufacturing sector, loans were 
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provided to the sector of construction and durable goods consumption (Esanov 2009: 21-22). 
Esanov concludes that “The uneven path of economic and institutional reforms has led to 
unbalanced growth across different sectors” (Esanov 2009: 32), and the absence of proper 
economic and democratic institutions hamper the accountability and responsiveness of the 
government. 
 
To conclude this section, although the approaches taken by Oskenbayev (2015), Eger and 
Leonard (2007) and Esanov (2009) tend to vary largely in both their findings and scope, they 
do not disclaim each other. Each study is estimating some specific factors, at the same time 
being neglectful of others. Having revealed that, it is possible that there is a significant 
connection between historical and cultural legacy, institutional framework and abundance in 
resources in Kazakhstan. Thus, a new approach that would combine the analysis of the stated 
above factors is needed if all the regional dynamics are to be understood and recognized. This 
study aims to take a closer look at resource related conditions and authorities‟ behavior 
responsible for the peculiarities of Kazakh developmental outcomes by bringing out previous 
empirical data. Moreover, there is a gap in current research in terms of looking at such factors 
altogether. 
 
3. Research Design and Methods 
 
This section includes the research design and methodology chosen for this study as well as its 
limitations. 
 
The research question determined both the choice of research design and methodology for 
conducting this study. This thesis will carry out the case study design, as it is about extensive 
examination/analysis of a single case (Bryman 2011: 67), which is contemporary Kazakhstan. 
The case study research accounts for the particular nature and complexity of the case 
(Bryman 2008: 66), which will provide an in-depth understanding of how dependence from 
natural resources has affected economic development of Kazakhstan. Both theories of 
resource curse and rentier state are tested in this study. In order to ensure the quality of 
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empirical findings, the thesis refers to data from reliable databases such as World Bank, IMF, 
UN, OECD, OSCE, Freedom House, Transparency International and Statistical Agency of 
Kazakhstan. It also focuses on the findings of both local and international researchers such as 
Esanov, Konkakov, Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva, Ross and others. 
 
This case study is a mixed-methods research that integrates both qualitative and quantitative 
data in the analysis in order to bring out holistic, more complete answer to the research 
question (Bryman 2008: 637). The quantitative indicators are employed in the thesis with the 
aim to analyze structural changes within the economy of Kazakhstan since its independence. 
However, since focusing primarily on measurements tends to describe only one side of the 
process, this study will employ qualitative findings too (Bryman 2008: 178). 
  
3.1 Limitations  
 
This approach has limitations: Firstly, Kazakhstan has been independent only for two and a 
half decades. As a consequence, data/research done on the effects of its resources over this 
period of time is scarce. Secondly, Kazakhstan, as a state with authoritarian tendencies, 
allows limited access to transparent, in-depth data and information. This is especially an issue 
related to the study of institutions and social structures - academic scholarship regarding 
these subjects is very limited. For these reasons, the contextual research of this thesis is based 
on empirical reporting and articles.  
 
 
4. Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework of this study will be focused on both the resource curse with its 
two sub models: Dutch Disease and Institutions; and on the rentier state theory, the latter 
concerning the effect of natural resource rents on the political economy of Kazakhstan. This 
is done for two reasons:  first, regarding the chosen sub models of the resource curse theory - 
not all the aspects of happenings in Kazakhstan would fit them, because the literature and 
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theories of the curse are based on the experience of Middle East and North Africa (Meissner 
2010: 9), and not on Central Asia. Second, the application of the rentier state theory will 
contribute significantly as it comes to emphasize other causal links between low levels of 
economic governance and rents, as well as it would cover the autocratic nature‟s presence 
(Ross 2001:  328). 
 
4.1 Dutch Disease  
. 
With regards to resource curse, Dutch Disease is one of the earliest concepts that appeared to 
link abundance in resources with lower economic growth (Corden 1984). Dutch Disease 
describes how effects from the resource windfalls as well as following appreciation of the 
exchange rate are detrimental for the rest of the economy. For example, the appreciation in 
exchange rate harms the so called „non-oil tradable sectors‟, like manufacturing. This, in turn, 
generates deindustralisation (Di John 2010: 2). The logic of a simple Dutch Disease 
theoretical concept could be described as: in the economy that is in full employment 
equilibrium, continuous increase in the external income inflow results in a relative prices 
change, benefiting services and construction (non-traded goods), and against the 
manufacturing and agriculture (non-oil traded goods). Consequently, non-oil tradeables are 
crowded out by the non-tradeables. Furthermore, production, employment and 
competitiveness of the traded goods sector declines (Di John 2010: 2). 
 
However, there are particular criticisms to this model. For instance, Ross (1999: 306) states 
that the model poorly fits the frameworks of developing states, since it assumes that capital 
and labor supplies are employed and fixed before the oil boom. Yet, developing states usually 
have labor surpluses and their booms attract foreign labor and capital. Furthermore, Gelb 
(1989) in his study on seven oil exporters during 1971-83 showed that only four had their 
labor shifted from manufacturing and agriculture sectors, in others manufacturing sectors 
were not harmed by export booms, although agriculture suffers. 
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4.2. Institutional quality 
 
Previously this study described how economic effects from possessing resources generate 
hardships for resource exporters. However, in order to explain why these hardships account 
for slower or unsustainable growth, we must be able to explain why governments and other 
institutions in the country fail to conduct reformative and efficient policies. Michael Ross 
(1999: 307) states that governments take an exceptionally large part in sustaining resource 
sectors in the economies of developing countries, which means institutions are decisive for 
the curse to occur and analysing them is essential, something that this study aims to do. 
 
In particular, this study will be referring to the model developed by Mehlum and Torvik 
(2006), who examined the impact of institutional quality on the resource curse. These authors 
investigated how “growth winners and growth losers differ” (2006: 1), relating to the type of 
institutions the state acquires. Particularly, institutions in their model were divided into two 
types: grabber friendly and producer friendly; they tend to push the aggregate income down 
or up, accordingly. When it comes to grabber friendly type, they promote gains from 
specialization in unproductive activities, due to, for example, a weak rule of law and 
corruption. Moreover, grabber friendly institutions are connected with the rent seeking 
activities that harm economic growth (Mehlum and Torvik 2006).  
 
4.3 Rentier State theory 
“Wherever a rent is to be found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get it” - 
Mueler (1989: 241) 
The model of the rentier state, introduced by Mahdavy (1970) aims to explain why the 
decision makers of resource dependent states create and strive to sustain growth-restricting 
policies (Di John 2011: 171). It explains the circumstances when the state starts to be more 
involved within the economy, it tends to grab more rents in order to reinforce its position in 
power as well as to further access to rents. Then institutional quality deteriorates, and that 
does not establish sustainable, long term economic diversification and democratization 
(ibid.). Applying the rentier state matters for this study, because unlike economic 
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explanations, political economy explanations of the curse are not tested oftentimes, “either 
quantitatively or with well selected qualitative case studies” (Ross 1999: 308). 
 
Michael Ross (2001) uses three explanations for this rentier state pattern: a) the „rentier 
effect’, which suggests that resource abundant economies are using low tax rates and 
patronage to damp down the democracy; b) the „repression effect‟, which explains that wealth 
gained from resources allows governments to repress social movements because their internal 
security becomes strengthened; c) the „modernization effect’, which indicates that resource 
driven economic growth does not bring about cultural and social changes (Ross 2001: 337), 
which generate democratic government. Both „rentier‟ and „repression‟ effects will be 
applied on Kazakshtan in this thesis except for the „modernization` one as Ross himself did 
not find the causal relationship between urbanization and higher education levels and 
democracy (Ross 2001). 
 
4.3.1 Rent-Seeking and Corruption 
 
Both indicators of corruption and rent seeking form a significant basis of the rentier state 
theoretical framework. Rent-seeking activities are defined as activities aiming at creating, 
sustaining as well changing both rents related rights and institutions (Milgrom and Roberts 
1990: 269; Di John 2011: 171-172). What happens is that with regards to resource allocation 
and economic regulations the extent of discretion from the state inclines. Therefore, oil 
economies become more vulnerable subject towards larger levels of corruption and rent-
seeking, compared to non-oil economies (Di John 2011: 172). Further on, this thesis 
integrates resource curse and rentier state theories in the analysis, the latter being a separate 
focus on the political economy of Kazakhstan.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
5. Analysis of empirical findings 
 
Figure 4, GDP Growth, WB 2017 
 
 
At the beginning of this study, it was revealed that Kazakhstan heavily depends on natural 
resources. Before examining other sectors of the Kazakh economy from the perspective of its 
ability to host sustainable economic diversification, let us look at Figure 4, which portrays 
GDP growth dynamics in different countries. The list includes former Soviet Union Countries 
characterized by unsustainable economic growth, which do and do not depend upon natural 
resources; as well as countries like Canada, Norway and United Arab Emirates. While the 
Resource Curse theory states that abundance of natural resources lead to poor economic 
development, the graph above makes it clear that the relationship between possessing 
resource and economic growth should not be regarded as a clear cut: it can be both negative 
and positive. Thus, it seems to point to the presence of both growth retarding and enhancing 
factors that make the resource prevalence a curse or a blessing. Further on, the paper is going 
to investigate other sectors of the economy and factors at work in order to assess 
Kazakhstan‟s economic prospects in the light of its oil welfare and the institutional heritage. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
5.1 Diversification trends 
  
Figure 5 shows annual growth dynamics in service sector, manufacturing and GDP per capita 
in Kazakhstan from 2001 up to 2016. 
Figure 5, GDP per Capita, services and manufacturing growth ( 2001 - 2016), WB 2017 
 
 
As seen in Figure 5, Periods of global economic downturns (2008-2009) and of sharp decline 
in oil prices on the global market in 2014 suggest that Kazakhstan remains vulnerable to 
fluctuations in commodity prices and other outer shocks, which is a sign of resource curse. 
Furthermore, by looking at Figure 6 `Structural composition of Kazakhstan’s GDP`, one can 
observe that the structure of GDP since independence has not gone through significant 
changes with industry, construction and other services activity remaining comparably or 
expanding at higher rates throughout 1991-2015 and agriculture reduced to half after the oil 
boom, from 2001 - 2015. One can conclude that there is a direct link between the boom in the 
primary sector and excessive growth in secondary sectors of the economy. Now, going back 
to Figure 5, the growth in manufacturing seems to be low as of 2016 (0.8 percent), which 
might point on the fact that natural resources sector is crowding manufacturing. 
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Figure 6, Structural Composition of Kazakhstan’s GDP (1991-2015), Ministry of National Economy             
 
 
5.1.2 Export Diversification Index 
 
So far, the empirical evidence of Kazakhstan suggests a weak and vulnerable economy, given 
large natural resource windfalls. Both the heavy reliance on a restricted production base and, 
thereafter,  an export base highly concentrated in fuels, e.g 61 % as of 2016 (OECD 2017), 
might be the reason for such an unsustainable economic development. 
Figure 7, The concentration of Kazakhstan’s exports (1992-2014), UN 2016 
 
Empirical evidence based on cross country regressions indicate that the curse works through 
export basket concentration, not through abundance in resources (Lederman and Maloney 
2008). The increasing concentration rates can be traced through the Herfindahl-Hirchman 
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Product Concentration index (HHI) - a measure of diffusion of the trade value across the 
products of exporter, which is portrayed on the figure 7 above. The country which exports 
only one type of commodity will possess a value of „1‟, while a country that has perfectly 
diversified her export portfolio, would have a „0‟ score (World Bank 2015). Based on the 
data from Figure 7, the concentration of exports on the basis of SITC 4 digit product groups 
went up to 0.41 in 2014, from 0.06 in 1993, which suggests that there is a lack of export 
diversification in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, one can observe that it is the increase in oil 
prices, which drives the greater concentration of exports. Given the large share of crude oil in 
exports, any concentration index would be defined by that share of oil out of total exports, be 
it in nominal or in deflated terms (OECD 2017: 54). In the case of Kazakhstan, the 
production was most concentrated during 1998-2009, due to increased importance of 
extractive sectors in the economy, and after that the trend has been reversed. 
 
Overall, it is concluded from the analysis of Kazakh economy that it can be portrayed as 
heavily dependent on oil and mining export, which consequently explains the high exposure 
of Kazakh economy‟s top sectors  to price fluctuations on the world market and indicates its 
large propensity of being cursed by natural resources. So far, Kazakhstan has developed 
under a conservative economic policy by relying on earnings from the exports of raw 
materials. The previous analyses in this study has shown that the weaknesses here lie in 
underinvestment in the other economic sectors and the clear instability of growth rates due to 
heavy dependence on changes in an external environment. The next chapter of this thesis will 
determine if the condition of Kazakhstan could be explained by resource curse by applying 
theoretical sub models on the case. 
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5.2 Resource Curse in Kazakhstan 
 
5.2.1 Dutch Disease in Kazakhstan 
 
 Figure 8, Structure of Production, 1993, 1998 and 2002 (in %)       
  The effects of Dutch 
Disease have been 
observed largely in 
international trade 
literature, especially 
in connection with 
resource dependent 
economies (Corden 
1984). As was stated 
in the theoretical 
framework section, 
the increase in resource driven exports leads to currency appreciation and declines incentives 
aimed at developing production of other goods, which harms the non-oil sectors in economy 
in the long run. Such linkage seems to resemble current conditions of the Kazakh economy, 
however, it is unlikely to be of great significance in Kazakhstan because of non-oil sectors 
atrophy in the economy already in existence before the oil boom period, during the 1990s 
(see Figure 8). The experience of the industrial production structure has been quite dramatic 
since then: though its share of GDP was about 29 % in 1993 and 2002, in 1993 less than ⅙ of 
industrial output accounted for petroleum, while in 2002 the share of petroleum was more 
than ⅓ and had an upward trend (Pomfret 2005: 870). Pomfret observed that the “agricultural 
processing industries' share of manufacturing output fell by a third between 1998 and 2002” 
(2005: 870), and the share of agriculture was reduced to half between 1993 and 1998. This 
means that the light industry was in significant decline before the oil boom (Kalyuzhnova et 
al 2004: 257-259, Pomfret 2005).  
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However, it is interesting that the rising oil sector in Kazakhstan has actually increased the 
competitiveness of the Kazakh economy (IMF 2014), which suggests us that the case of 
Kazakhstan might not be fully explained by resource curse; there are other important 
structural factors at play. 
 
5.2.2 Institutional quality 
 
Natural resource curse theory states that resource wealth tends to initiate a fight over 
revenues from resources, which consequently results in poor quality of institutions and lower 
growth. This study is using the model of Mehlum and Torvik (2006), which divides 
institutions into grabber friendly and producer friendly types to indicate their impact on 
economic development in the country. For the analysis of institutional quality in Kazakhstan, 
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for 2000-2015 were derived for 2000-2017. WGI 
focus on six important dimensions such as Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, 
Regulatory Quality, Corruption Control, Government Effectiveness and Political 
Stability/Absence of Terrorism within percentile ranks. They range from 0 to 100, where 0 
indicates the lowest quality rank and 100 the highest (WGI 2017). Figure 9 below indicates 
the following dynamics: 
Figure 9, WGI Indicators, 2017    
                   World Governance Indicators for Kazakhstan (2000, 2015) 
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It can be observed that while still possessing quite low indicators of institutional quality, 
Kazakhstan has actually achieved some improvements since independence. These were 
observed in such governance indicators as rule of law, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption and effectiveness of the government. However, Kazakhstan failed to make a 
progress in other very important aspects of governance, such as political stability and voice 
and accountability. For instance, while in 2000-2015, the percentile of government 
effectiveness increased almost twofold, from 26.0 to 51.0, the voice and accountability 
indicator percentile decreased from 21.0 to 17.0 (WGI 2017). Additionally, the efforts of the 
government to reduce levels of corruption brought somewhat limited results - 25.0 as of 2015 
(WGI 2017), but still this indicator remains within the lower percentile. Referring back to 
Mehlum and Torvik (2006: 1), the weak rule of law and corruption imply the presence of 
grabber friendly institutions in Kazakhstan, which is the sign of negative resource curse 
presence through institutional channels in the country. 
 
5.2.2.1 Sovereign Welfare and National Funds in Kazakhstan 
 
In order to foster diversification of its economy, the country adopted a specific 
industrialization program - the `State Program for Accelerated Industrial and Innovative 
Development’ (SPAIID) for the period of 2010-2014. The aim was to form a proper 
institutional and legislative basis, as well as develop the infrastructure across the country for 
the sake of economic diversification. While 770 projects have been implemented creating 
75,000 jobs, which in turn led to production of 400 types of new products (Konkakov 2016: 
14), the economy has remained heavily dependent from resources revenues. Lack of 
transparency in checks and balances is a major issue that considerably reduces the efficiency 
of such government programs, and, as a result, regardless of how well the program was 
designed, the outcomes were below the target level (OECD 2017, Konkakov 2016). 
 
In order to manage the income from the natural resources, Kazakhstan has created the 
National Fund (NF) in the year of 2000. The mission of the Fund has been “to save financial 
resources for future generations and to reduce the country's dependence on international raw 
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material markets” (Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015: 123). In order to execute NF‟s savings 
function, the maximum savings amount was defined as unlimited, the minimum, however, 
has been defined. The stabilization function has been secured by guaranteed transfers to the 
state; the funds assets totalled US $65 bln in 2013. Furthermore, the monitoring system is 
tightly linked to the president (ibid.).  
 
The performance of economic institutions of Sovereign Welfare Fund „Samruk Kazyna‟ 
(SWF), which was created to facilitate diversification, has not achieved the targets either. The 
Fund is an exclusive shareholder of Kazakhstan Development Fund and keeps hold of 
interests in gas, oil energy, finance, construction, property and transportation sectors (Esanov 
2009: 16). While it is challenging to distinguish between social and commercial goals of the 
fund, both the lack of transparency and dependence from excessive government support are 
some of the biggest issues within the Fund. Esanov (2009: 17) stated that the governing board 
does not have any NGOs representatives and that the sharing power principle is violated as 
well, since decision making power is in the hands of one agency.  
 
As was stated before in this study, resource abundance in a rentier state is a basis for low 
quality and predatory state institutions. The empirical evidence described in this section 
suggests that Kazakhstan could be regarded as a rentier state. The establishment of such 
funds in the country is a clear example of low transparency levels in the extractive sector, as 
well as in the whole distribution of the income from resource exports (Satpayev and 
Umbetaliyeva 2015: 123- 124). 
 
5.3 Kazakhstan as a Rentier State 
 
The rentier state is associated with the high level of corruption (Di John 2011: 172); thus, 
Kazakhstan had a score of 29 out of 100 of the corruption perception Index, where 0 stands 
for “highly corrupt” and 100 for “very clean” (Transparency International 2015). The 
corruption issue, which is mainly attributed to post Soviet features such as informal and 
neopatrimonial structures, so far remains too complex to solve. Thus, almost all political 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
levels in the country have been formed by informal structures and corruption (Satpayev 
2006). 
 
Second, a high level of corruption in combination with a weak system of state management 
culminates in the opaque management of natural resources by a narrow circle of government 
officials (Satpayev 2006). The Freedom House states that the democracy levels failed to 
strengthen in Kazakhstan - the country possesses the aggregate score of 22 out of 100 
regarding the freedom status, where 0 indicates the least democratic state (refer to Figure 10). 
   
Figure 10, Kazakhstan Profile: Freedom in the World Scores, Freedom House 2017 
 
 
According to Freedom House, in 2010-2017, the freedom score deteriorated from 5.5 to 6.0, 
6.0 being the least free, and democracy level has a score of 6.64/7 where 7.0 indicates the 
complete absence of democracy, which reflects on the worsening processes of elections, non-
existence of independent media and civil society in Kazakhstan recently (Freedom House 
2017). 
 
As mentioned previously, there are certain specific characteristics that characterize state a 
„rentier‟: significant domination of rents in the economy, few people engaged in rents 
generation, as well as rents externality (Beblawi 1987). Despite the popular motto of the 
country‟s authorities “First the economy, then politics” (Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015: 
124), stating that economic development, being a priority, can be separated from political 
reforms, the rentier state approach seems to be appropriate for Kazakhstan. Here a specific 
cultural factor puzzle, responsible for such development outcomes, falls into place: the 
aforementioned clans concept laid out the basis for the neopatrimonial system, which is 
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grounded on kinship and trust, extending on both vertical and horizontal levels of the Kazakh 
political system (Satpayev 2006: 95). Hereby, there is a hierarchically structured elite 
pyramid in Kazakhstan with serious ethnocentric policy of recruitment (Dave 2007), where 
elites depend on the natural resource income, coming from sales on foreign markets with 
volatile prices dependent upon external circumstances (Satpayev 2015: 123). 
 
The last part of this study will elaborate on the rentier and repression effects of the rentier 
state by applying the framework articulated by Ross (2011). 
 
5.3.1 Taxation effect 
 
Figure 11, Tax revenue (% of GDP) in Kazakhstan, WB 2017 
 
Based on Ross‟s framework, 
there are three parts 
comprising the rentier effect, 
such as taxation, group 
formation and spending 
effects. Particularly, the 
absence of an efficient tax 
system is one of the features 
that portrays rentier states 
(Ross 2001: 333). The reason why the government tends to tax less, or sometimes not at all, 
is because taxation gives the ground for citizens to demand democracy, proper political 
participation and liability (ibid). If we look at the Figure 11, we can see that the rate was 
fluctuating from 10 to 18 percent in 2000-2015, which suggests that taxation in Kazakhstan 
does not hold a significant share in its GDP (WB 2017). Thus, since most of the state income 
is coming from resource exports, one could affirm that the taxation system in the country is 
not a significant concern for the authorities to maintain and develop, as of now. 
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5.3.2 Spending effect 
 
Figure 12, Government Expenditures ( % of GDP), WB 2017 
 
The second effect, referred to as a 
„spending effect‟ describes the way 
governments tend to maintain their 
power in rentier states.  
It states that governments are using 
rents towards miscellaneous 
development programs, as well as 
subsidies of particular sectors in the economy - to put it simply, rentier states pursue 
considerable fiscal spending in order to make their power legitimate ( Ross 2001: 333-334; 
Meissner 2010: 11). Interestingly enough in Kazakhstan the government expenditure was 
22.1 % as of 2016 (IMF 2017), which is much lower than that of OECD countries (OECD 
2014: 61) and of other resource rich economies (WB 2017). However, if looking at the 
efficiency of this spending, the modernization plan “SPAIID” and creation of welfare funds 
(thesis‟ section 5.2.2.1), are perfect examples of a spending effect on patronage (Ross 2001: 
333). Indeed, Kazakhstan has achieved significant success in combating the poverty and 
rising living standards of its population; however this is not the outcome of its 
industrialization plans, but rather a consequence of a rentier economy (OSCE 2013). 
 
5.3.3 Group  Formation  Effect 
 
Finally, there is a third constituent of a rentier effect - the `group formation` effect, stating 
that rentier states tend to suppress opposition, or any kind of independent social groups, to the 
status quo since they are seen as a threat for existence of the state. It has been mentioned 
before that the freedom of speech is restricted in the country, and that the opposition has been 
marginalized (Freedom House 2017). That describes how the rentier behavior in Kazakhstan 
destabilizes civil society - the necessary precondition for a democratic state. Kazakh civil 
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society groups lack any significant support from within and outside of society, although 
international NGOs have somehow managed to establish a more influential dialogue with the 
state than other parties in the country (Franke et al. 2009: 131). 
 
5.3.4 Repression effect 
 
Table 13. Military expenditure (% of GDP) in Kazakhstan - WB 2017 
year 2013 2014 2015 2016 
rate 0,9 1,0 1,1 0,8 
 
The repression effect entails that the rentier governments are inclined to spend state income 
on security matters so as to strengthen their authority and retard democratization. Regarding 
Kazakhstan, it spends on average 1 percent of its GDP on its security apparatus (see the table 
above), which contradicts this spending aspect of the theory‟s repression effect. However, the 
repression effect also states that government spending goes for the sake of preserving ruling 
elites, as well as for the continuing integrity of the government by suppressing domestic mass 
unrests, aspirations and protests (Ross 2001: 335), which is exactly what happened in the 
Kazakh oil town Zhanaozen, where major mass unrest and protests happened in 2011 
(Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015: 125). Therefore, having a military apparatus is important 
with regards to protection of country‟s energy resources and related facilities which tend to 
be situated in unstable territories (Ross 2001). 
 
The well-known labor conflict in the oil town of Zhanaozen in Western Kazakhstan in 
December 2011 clearly demonstrates the linkages between the rentier state, social tensions 
and oil industry in the country. The mass unrest resulted from unfair distribution of dividends 
from the natural resource rents between the oil companies and the local workers (Freedom 
House 2017). Kazakh workers demanded equal rights and pay with foreign workers and 
abolished the restrictions imposed on independent labor unions activity (Satpayev and 
Umbetaliyeva 2015: 126). The conflict escalated on the 16th of December, 2011 on the 
central square of the city, where: “... hundreds of protesters had set up their tents for more 
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than six months, at least 16 people were killed and more than 100 injured” (Satpayev and 
Umbetaliyeva 2015: 126; Kourmanova 2012). The shooting happened as the police was 
trying to clear out the area for celebrations of the Independence Day of Kazakhstan (ibid.). 
To sum this up, it has been observed that the country follows the framework of Ross‟ 
repression effect: although the military spending does not tend to be high, it aims to protect 
the infrastructure of oil producing industries, which are exposed to security threats around the 
highly charged borders of Caspian Sea. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Through the extensive analysis of empirical findings, this study answers its main overarching 
question: How does dependence on natural resources affect the economic development in 
Kazakhstan? with two sub questions: a) Is economic development deficient due to poor 
political institutions? b) If poor political institutions are present, shall the case of Kazakhstan 
be defined by the resource curse or the rentier state theory? 
 
This was done through applying two theories: the natural resource curse and the rentier state 
on the case of Kazakhstan since independence. First, the study revealed a large dominance of 
rents from natural resources in the Kazakh economy and as a consequence of that deficient 
economic development in Kazakhstan. Neither the economy structure, nor the export basket 
displayed noteworthy changes. The analysis indicated the presence of weak institutions in the 
country, both economic and political, that have negatively affected the process of economic 
development. Furthermore, the absence of strong institutions has formed a system vacuum, 
giving clans and shadow economy an opportunity to grow strong. Thus, the post Soviet neo-
patrimonial regime in Kazakhstan has strengthened the effects of rentierism, which was 
proved by testing the second theory of a rentier state against the experience of Kazakhstan. 
To conclude, it shall be contested that resource curse theory alone is not able to justify 
Kazakhstan‟s inability to be engaged in significant steps towards proper governance of 
sustainable economic diversification. However, Kazakhstan can be defined as a rentier state, 
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particularly a Post Soviet rentier state with miscellaneous cultural, historical and specific 
structural preconditions at work. 
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